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There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early 
modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776)     is 
a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which 
teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical 
accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these 
approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological 
‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of 
human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, 
we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human 
nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. 
 
Teleology: metaphysical, Christian, political 
There are distinct domains or ways of thinking of reality within which tele- 
ology can be seen as relevant, that is, with respect to the causal interaction 
between ordinary objects in the world, with respect to individuals and with 
respect to society and political progress. In this section, we shall sketch 
teleological accounts of these kinds in order to clarify what is meant by 
teleology and the kinds of ways it has been seen as playing a role in nature. We 
shall also note Hume’s rejection of all such accounts. 
First, there is the Aristotelian notion of final causes. A final cause is the 
end-point towards which things are directed. These are mind-independent 
features of the natural order. The final cause is the ‘cause of causes’. As 
Boulter describes it, a final cause is ‘that which causes the efficient cause of X 
to bring about this arrangement in the stuff of X rather than some other 
arrangement’.1 Hume rejects this Aristotelian framework: ‘[A]ll causes are of 
the same kind, and . . . there is no foundation for that distinction, which we 
sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and formal, and material . . . and final 
causes.’2 Further, the one kind of cause that remains is not easily identifiable 
with any of those posited by Aristotle. Both our everyday beliefs about the 
 
causal structure of the world and our causal science are derived from the way 
we project experienced regularities onto the world and not from knowledge 
of mind-independent features of the natural order. 
 
Second, there is the notion of the teleology of individuals and, for Christians, 
the teleology of a person – the end-point at which they are directed – is, all being 
well, eternal life and salvation. Hume has no truck with such thinking, and this 
is agreed upon even by those who do not interpret Hume as a hardline atheist. 
Harris, in his recent intellectual biography, takes Hume as having ‘a maximally 
detached and disengaged point of view’ with respect to religion, considering 
it with ‘ruthless impartiality, as if describing nothing more emotionally 
engaging than some bizarre belief systems so long extinct as to be bound to 
be all but unintelligible to the reader’.3 A persuasive case is made that there 
was ‘little genuine intellectual affinity between Hume and the philosophes’,4 
bristly atheists such as Diderot and d’Alembert whom Hume met in Paris. 
Hume was sceptical that writers could change and improve the world, history 
giving us ‘no reason to believe that philosophy might be able to do anything 
at all to weaken the hold of religion on the vast majority of people’.5 He 
preferred the company of moderate Scottish Presbyterians such as Robert 
Wallace, Thomas Reid and George Campbell. Harris sees his interpretation as 
a corrective to the irreligious picture of Hume in which he is portrayed as The 
Great Infidel (the title of Graham’s 2006 biography).6 The latter is the 
standard line and it has been developed by, amongst others, Herdt, Bailey 
and O’Brien, and Rus- sell.7 However, whichever interpretation one favours, 
all agree that Hume had no personal faith; he saw no positive connection 
between religious belief and morality, and, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion,8 the case for theism ‘crumbles almost into nothing under rational 
examination’.9 
Hume does, though, make the surprising claim in his essay, ‘Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth’, that ‘it is vain to think that any free government will ever 
have security or stability’ without an established Church and clergy.10 
However, even if this is a sincere claim, it is not one derived from ideological 
commitment or teleological claims concerning an inevitable future political 
state. That religion may have played a role in stabilising society at points in 
history is a highly contingent historical claim and does not in any way 
legitimise the tenets of particular historically-situated religions. This is 
confirmed by Hume’s tongue-in-cheek suggestion that clerics should be paid 
by the state – not to cement their legitimacy – but in order to ‘bribe them to 
indolence’.11 Given that religion exists, it would be dangerous to suppress it. 
We should instead buffer religious fanaticism with state-funded moderates. 
As Baier says, ‘A less religious justification for establishing religion could 
scarcely be imagined.’12 
Harris is right that Hume often meets religion with humour rather than 
anger or frustration, but the humour is often cutting, mocking and acerbic, 
particularly so in the History of England. Harris even agrees with Carlyle, a 
friend of Hume’s, that Hume is ‘by no means an atheist’.13 It is not completely 
 
clear, though, why this is denied. Part of the reason is that Hume should not 
be seen as an atheist in the eighteenth-century context given that this would 
suggest a dogmatic commitment to some kind of naturalistic metaphysical 
view of reality, which, arguably, is inconsistent with Hume’s scepticism. Harris 
seems to suggest, though, that Hume is also not an atheist in today’s sense. If 
so, then his characterisation of contemporary atheism is unduly narrow. It 
may be true that the revolutionary zeal and dogmatism of the philosophes was 
not to Hume’s taste, nor would be the temperamentally-akin New Atheism of 
today. It may also be true that he preferred to talk about politics and 
economics rather than religion, but none of this undermines his credentials as 
a certain kind of atheist: one who is non-dogmatic, tactful with friends whose 
deeply held commitments are different to his own, perhaps at times weary 
of the fight and sceptical of any lasting disintegration of religion, but one 
who, nevertheless, wielded an armoury of argument and biting humour 
against organised religion in all its forms and thus against teleology in 
Christian form. 
Third, teleology can be applied at the level of the nation. Contemporaries 
of Hume typically answered questions concerning the relationship between 
liberty and authority by appealing to inalienable rights – Tories favouring those 
of the monarch, while Whigs sought a return to ancient freedoms possessed 
before the Norman conquest. Hume thought such a ‘prelapsarian’ state 
mythical: ‘There had been no freedom worth the name in the Saxon period’ 
and the ‘Magna Carta was by no means a codification of ancient English 
liberties’.14 The latter had merely codified a deal between the barons and the 
king, and, as a side-effect, the populace had benefitted. ‘English history was a 
story of continual change, not of a return to first principles’15: a result of 
complex vying for power between the monarchy, nobility and people. 
Further, any attempt to radically change the political order is more than likely 
to fail and cause harm. Cromwell’s republic was ‘a wild aberration fuelled 
largely by religious fanaticism’,16 and it ended up achieving nothing. Hume 
took the side of the King in the civil war, but this was only on pragmatic 
grounds; it did not reflect his commitment to Tory ideology. ‘What mattered 
in government was stability, order, and the protection of rights of property’ 
and the status quo generally maintains these better than violent upheaval.17 
Hume, Harris argues, ‘broke altogether with the tradition of English 
historiography. He was asserting, in effect, that the past had no political 
significance Politically speaking, it was 
the present, and the future, that mattered’18 – a future, though, that was 
open; one that was not always in the process of being borne back into a past 
of ‘first principles’, be they Tory or Whig. 
In this chapter, though, we shall not focus on these particular metaphysical, 
theological and political issues, but rather on human nature and morality, 
realms that resisted the early modern move away from teleology towards 
naturalistic explanation. Locke and Hutcheson, for example, both take 
important steps towards a fully naturalistic account of human nature and 
morality, but they do not jettison all teleological elements. For Hutcheson, 
 
the moral distinctions we draw are based on feelings or ‘natural affections’ 
of approval and disapproval, and not on eternal moral truths that can be 
discerned by reason alone.19 Hutcheson thus grounds morality in human 
nature, a nature that should be investigated empirically. Such investigation, 
though, reveals the divine origin of our natural sentiments and thus its 
teleological dimension. We agree with each other on what is virtuous, and 
these hard-wired affective responses lead to us acting in ways that are 
beneficial to ourselves and to others. Such harmony cannot be down to 
chance, but rather to the design of a benevolent creator: ‘This account of 
Affections will . . . prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for 
the Goodness of the Deity, from the Constitution of our Nature.’20 Hume 
concurs with the empirical approach that Hutcheson takes to morality and 
with his emphasis on the importance of the natural affections or ‘moral 
sentiments’, but he takes the extra step and, as noted by Taylor, he ‘effectively 
displaces the teleological explanations so prevalent even in the works of those 
he lauded, such as Locke, Butler, and Hutcheson’.21 Hume’s firm rejection of 
teleology is confirmed in a 1739 letter to Hutcheson, in which, it is thought, 
Hume is responding to Hutcheson’s criticisms of the account of morality 
presented in a draft manuscript of the Treatise.22 In this letter Hume says 
 
I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. ’Tis founded on final Causes; 
which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & 
unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for 
Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or for 
his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these 
Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose.23 
 
It is upon Hume’s non-teleological account of human nature that the next sec- 
tion begins to focus. 
 
The science of man 
In the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume tells us that he wants to develop a 
‘science of man’.24 Such a science is also presented in the Abstract of the Treatise 
and in Section 1 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.25 We shall 
spell out its methodological aspects, and then the conception of human 
nature to which it leads. 
Hume argues that the science of man encompasses all the other sciences. 
It is foundational in character: ‘’Tis evident, that all the sciences have a 
relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them 
may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another.’26 
When he says ‘all the sciences’, he means all of them, not just those 
enterprises that might appear to be closer to the operations of human nature, 
such as morality, literary and artistic criticism and politics. Thus: 
 
Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some mea- 
sure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under cognizance 
 
of men, and are judged of by their power and faculties.27 
 
The method used by Hume to develop his science of man is strictly empirical, 
the subtitle of the Treatise being ‘An Attempt to introduce the experimental 
Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. At the core of this method there is  
‘experience and observation’,28 and by relying on these, Hume follows in the 
footsteps of Francis Bacon, John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Bernard Mandeville, 
Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler and Isaac Newton. He talks with ‘contempt 
of hypotheses’, that is, of any explanation that is advanced before and 
independently of experiential confirmation.29 
By following this method, it becomes possible to reduce the science of man 
to a small number of principles, in the same way as the Newtonian method 
arrives at a set of principles in natural philosophy: 
 
But ’tis at least worth while to try if the science of man will not admit of 
the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found 
susceptible of. There seems to be all the reason in the world to imagine 
that it may be carried to the greatest degree of exactness. If, in examining 
several phaenomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one 
common principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at 
last arrive at those few simple principles, on which all the rest depend.30 
 
Hume ‘proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner, and 
promises to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience’.31 
The result is an ‘anatomy’ of human nature that results in a kind of ‘mental 
geography’.32 Such a study is not an easy task. This is because, to begin with, 
‘we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, 
concerning which we reason’.33 Thus, performing experiments in this case is 
very different from the way we do this with all the other sciences, where 
‘[w]hen I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any 
situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe the results from 
it’. We cannot readily do this with ‘moral subjects’. The experiments that the 
scientist of human nature can hope to examine are of a very different sort: 
 
We must . . . glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common 
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their 
pleasures.34 
 
What results from this is a notion of human nature that incorporates our social 
relations with each other. If one looks to the Treatise, only Book 1, ‘Of the 
Understanding’, is devoted to the operations of the individual mind, and this 
only in part. Book 2 is on the passions, while Book 3 focuses on ethical mat- 
ters. Human beings are not isolated minds, that can be seen as independent 
from the actions that these embodied minds perform and the social relations 
in which they take part. The science of man thus goes beyond the mere 
analysis of mind. 
 
This becomes even clearer in Section 1 of the first Enquiry. There, Hume 
observes that philosophers can be anatomists or painters. While the painter 
‘employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful 
and engaging airs’, hence promoting virtue and discouraging vice, the 
anatomist provides the painter with a detailed examination of 
 
the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the 
fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part and organ. 
Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to 
delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the 
other.35 
 
The job of the anatomist is to inquire into ‘the abstruse philosophy’,36 so as to 
find the first principles of human nature, and thus come 
 
to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from 
each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that 
seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of 
reflexion and enquiry.37 
 
But again, as was the case in the Treatise, in the first Enquiry the objects of this 
examination are presented as always dependent on the reality in which they 
act and live: ‘Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being. Man is also 
an 
active being.’38 The ‘spirit of accuracy’ that distinguishes the anatomist’s con- 
duct is always ‘subservient to the interests of society’,39 and the science of man 
would be hamstrung without the perspectives of both the anatomist and the 
painter. Therefore, the scientist of human nature, to properly realise her goal 
– that is, to offer a complete description of human nature – should listen to 
both the anatomist and the painter, and see the object of her study as a 
creature that thinks but also feels and acts together with other people: 
 
Indulge your passion for science, says she [nature], but let your science be 
human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. . .  
Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.40 
 
Let us now, as it were, put some flesh on Hume’s account of human nature: let 
us consider the content that emerges from the survey of human beings seen ‘in 
company, in affairs, and in their pleasures’. This consists of certain consistent 
features of human behaviour, those directly observable, and those that have 
revealed themselves in the course of human affairs as they unfold throughout 
history. Direct observation and the study of history disclose a basic uniformity in 
human motives, which allows us to predict human conduct to a high degree of 
accuracy: 
 
Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these 
passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have 
 
been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the 
actions and the enterprizes, which have ever been observed among 
mankind. 
 
Moreover, observation and history permit us to compare different social 
situations distant in space and time, and note similarities between them: 
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the 
greeks and romans? Study well the temper and actions of the french  
and english: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former 
most of the observations, which you have made with regard to the latter. 
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history 
informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular.41 
 
Hume resumes this comparison between Roman and Greek societies, on the 
one hand, and French and English ones, on the other, in A Dialogue, and this 
seems to illustrate the constancy of human nature notwithstanding the 
multiplicity of its manifestations: 
 
The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet both spring from the same 
mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite directions, by the 
same principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on 
which they run, cause all the difference of their courses.42 
 
There are, though, variations that can be observed in the behaviour of 
individuals from one society to another, and there is some debate as to 
whether Hume offers an account of human nature that is independent of the 
context in which it plays out. Different weight has been attributed by Hume 
scholars to social context in determining the regularities in human nature. 
Cohen, Walsh and Berry, for example, favour an account in which Hume 
elaborates a theory of human nature that, despite being given in history and 
in specific contexts, is, nonetheless, not reducible to these.43 Walsh, for 
example, remarks that ‘Hume proposes to treat these differences as 
supervenient upon, or per- haps as specifications of, a common human 
nature which we all share’.44 In contrast, according to Forbes, Hume upholds 
a form of ‘sociological relativism’ whereby 
 
[t]he universal principles are to be regarded as abstractions from the 
concrete variety of human (= social) experience; Hume’s ‘general 
psychology’ is concerned with the function and mechanism, not the 
content of the mind, which is various and supplied by social and historical 
circumstances.45 
 
However, for our purposes, we need not make a stand on this issue. The key 
claim is that human nature – be it context-dependent or context-independent 
– is a contingent fact about human beings that is revealed through history 
and through observation of our social relations with others. It is not, as it was 
 
for other naturalistically minded thinkers of the early modern period, the 
product of a divine creator and his purposes, whatever they may be. 
 
Human flourishing, teleology and Humean ends 
We have seen how Hume arrives at his account of human nature by empirical 
and historical means. In this section, we shall distinguish his approach from 
a priori conceptions of human nature, those grounded in teleologically-
based accounts of what it is for individuals and for societies to flourish. 
For Hume, we must remain satisfied with what experience teaches us, with- 
out concerning ourselves with what is beyond the limits of experience – that 
is, we must accept the ‘impossibility of explaining ultimate principles’.46 It is, 
though, ‘a satisfaction to go as far as our faculties will allow us’.47 As he claims 
in the Introduction to the Treatise: 
 
[I]t [is] . . . impossible to form any notion of its [the mind’s] powers and 
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the 
observation of those particular effects, which result from its different 
circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all 
our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to 
the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest 
causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any 
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of 
human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and 
chimerical.48 
 
Not only the science of man, but all the other sciences, and all the arts, cannot 
‘go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on 
that authority’.49 Experience is the starting point for our inquiries into human 
nature. At the same time, experience appears to be the extreme limit within 
which the notion of human nature can have meaning: 
 
When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human 
reason, we sit down contented; tho’ we be perfectly satisfied in the main 
of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most 
general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their 
reality.50 
 
Therefore, the principles of the science of human nature are established on the 
basis of an examination of human affairs, and these same principles are then 
applied to understand the concrete phenomena of human life, in which they 
are adapted to the variety of circumstances in which human life expresses itself. 
Within this picture, Hume’s conception of human nature is strictly devoid of any 
teleology: all our conclusions regarding human nature are derived from 
observation, and do not depend on ideas about how human nature should be 
framed. Considerations derived from experience do not allow us to take for 
 
granted any final end, nor do they say anything of any alleged essence of human 
nature. 
Hume’s approach can thus be contrasted with a neo-Aristotelian strategy, 
such as that of Philippa Foot, one in which it is possible to isolate ‘Aristotelian 
categoricals’, that is, teleological judgments that identify what is naturally good 
or bad for a certain species. Aristotelian categoricals reveal themselves in 
experience; even so, they represent the a priori conditions that make species 
flourish: ‘Part of what distinguishes an Aristotelian categorical from a mere 
statistical proposition about some or most or all the members of a kind of 
living thing is the fact that it relates to the teleology of the species.’51 
Conversely, for Hume, any such views concerning human flourishing are 
generalisations only, drawn from observation of constancy in people’s con- 
duct as they behave in different situations, in different contexts and at 
different times. When it comes to determine Aristotelian categoricals for 
humans, Foot lists the virtues as an integral part of the definition of human 
nature and of what makes it thrive; a good human being is someone who 
acts according to the virtues, since it is these that specify the telos of human 
beings. On the contrary, for Hume, what we observe regarding human 
conduct does not tell us anything regarding the telos of human nature; we 
cannot say what our virtuous actions are for, or what our lives as a whole are 
for, either in terms of the design plan of a benevolent creator or in terms of 
Aristotelian categoricals. 
That is not to say, though, that Hume does not provide an account of what 
it is for humans to flourish, for them to be, in a non-teleological sense, doing 
well. Empirically speaking, it is possible to register what is pleasant and what is 
painful to humans, and thus to derive principles to determine what is good 
or bad for them – such principles being ‘inseparable from our make and 
constitution’.52 Specifically, Hume argues that human beings appreciate, and 
hence find virtuous, what is immediately agreeable or what is useful to 
themselves or to others. Conversely, they are averse to, and hence find vicious, 
what is immedi- ately disagreeable or disadvantageous to themselves or to 
others.53 These criteria are derived from experience and, in turn, when 
applied to human conduct, universally determine what is virtuous or vicious 
to human beings. Hume can thus criticise certain ways of living that have 
characterised particular periods in history. This is what he says, for example, 
regarding the Christian or ‘monkish virtues’ of ‘[c]elibacy, fasting, penance, 
mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, [and] solitude’: 
 
[f]or what reason are they every where rejected by men of sense, but 
because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s 
for- tune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; 
neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encrease his 
power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all 
these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, 
obscure the fancy and sour the temper. 
 
 
As such forms of behaviour are not conducive to human flourishing, we 
‘justly . . . transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the 
catalogue of vices’. Hume ends this polemic with a cutting attack on 
sainthood: 
 
A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the 
calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and 
society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.54 
 
Hume, therefore, offers an account of what is natural for human beings that 
bears both a descriptive and a prescriptive valence. By looking at how human 
beings have behaved in the course of their history, they can be described 
as approving of what is agreeable or useful to themselves or to other people. 
This also represents a normative measure to judge what is good or bad for 
them,55 allowing Hume to conceive a ‘dynamic or progressive’ engine operating 
within human relations, thus admitting the possibility of the correction of 
human behaviour due to experience and reasoning.56 This is in contrast to 
‘artificial systems’ such as those which incorporate the monkish virtues, in 
that these are characterised by a static and definitive conception of human 
life that rejects at the outset any possibility of correction via experience and 
reasoning.57 
What is crucial, however, is that this normative measure does not reflect 
any final end for human beings that can be stated prior to experience and 
that unfurls, pre-ordained, through history. If human beings can be described 
as appreciating what is agreeable or useful – and such appreciation of virtue 
can be seen to progress and develop – this is the result of empirical 
observation that does not presuppose any teleology in Hume’s approach. 
 
A final speculation: Hume and Darwinian teleology 
Hume thus rejects Aristotelian, scholastic and Christian notions of teleology, 
in favour of the science of man or what is today called naturalism. Such an 
approach is now mainstream, although, as we have seen, there are 
exceptions such as Foot.58 There remains, though, a respectable form of 
teleology in con- temporary philosophy, one most prominent in teleological 
accounts of cognition and morality. This is where teleology is cashed out in 
evolutionary terms. In this final section we shall, anachronistically of course, 
speculate concerning what Hume’s attitude to such teleology would be. Such 
speculation will clarify both what is distinctive about Hume’s account of 
human nature, and also certain claims concerning the historical importance 
and relevance of Hume to contemporary naturalism. This, for example, is what 
I said in the Reader’s Guide to Hume’s Enquiry: 
 
Cognitive science is now an interdisciplinary research programme that 
brings together workers in psychology, computer science, 
neurophysiology, linguistics, evolutionary biology and philosophy. . . . 
 
[Hume] is an important precursor to this whole movement. It is not too 
fanciful to claim that Hume would have looked very favourably on this 
modern approach to the mind, and, if he were around today, one can 
easily see him as a director of a cognitive science programme rather than 
as a professor of metaphysics or traditional epistemology [i]t is not hard 
to imagine Hume embracing a Darwinian evolutionary account of life and 
of the mind.59 
 
In one sense, this is uncontroversial. Given his account of animal cognition, 
Hume would surely have accepted an evolutionary account of the origin of 
man. Traditionally, humans were seen to hold a special place in the natural 
order of things, a place higher than that of animals. Some philosophers have 
claimed that this is because we have a kind of insight into the nature of the 
world that animals lack. Through a priori reasoning alone we can come to 
know truths about the nature of the world: we can know, for example, that 
every event has a cause, and that God exists. Such insight is a product of our 
‘Understanding’ or ‘Reason’, and, as Locke puts it, ‘it is the Understanding that 
sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and 
Dominion which he has over them.’60 Such powers of reasoning place us above 
animals and nearer to God in the natural order.61 
Such an elevated conception of human nature is the target of Hume’s science 
of man. We do not have rational insight into the essential nature of the world. 
Such God-like insight is replaced by the kind of processes that also govern 
animal thinking. Hume argues by analogy. Animal behaviour is similar to our 
own in various ways, and such similarities suggest that animals have certain 
experiences and ways of thinking in common with man. 
 
No truth appears to me more evident, than that the beasts are endowed 
with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case 
so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.62 
 
Hume does, however, acknowledge that there are certain differences 
between human and animal thought. Human thought is unique in that it 
turns to questions of morality, law and religion. Later philosophers have come 
to focus on man’s linguistic abilities, and it is these that enable our thought 
to be more sophisticated. Hume does not consider this route,  although he 
does note   that testimony from books and conversation enlarges our 
experience and thus enables us to have thoughts that would be beyond  an 
isolated individual (or  a non-linguistic animal). He also suggests other 
naturalistic explanations for differences between animal and human thinking. 
First, cognitive abilities vary between people – and between people and 
animals – because there are differences in powers of attention and memory, 
and these differences, in turn, lead to differences in reasoning capacity. 
Second, ‘larger’ minds can more easily think about complex systems of objects 
and pursue longer chains of causal reasoning. For Hume, similar quantitative 
differences between the cognitive powers of men and animals explain why 
 
our thinking is capable of more complex operations.63 Nevertheless, the 
suggestion here is that Hume would likely be conducive to Darwinian 
developments – a century later – given his views on the continuity between 
animal and human thought.64 
However, contemporary teleological theories of mental content do not simply 
claim that human cognitive processes are the product of natural selection. 
They go further, with the nature of mental content and its normative 
dimension defined in evolutionary terms: (very roughly) my belief has the 
content that the sky is blue because believing the sky is blue when the sky is 
indeed blue has given our ancestors a survival advantage and thus the 
cognitive structures that enable us to have such thoughts have been selected 
for.65 Here, though, speculations concerning whether Hume would accept 
such an account are stretched to the limit, given his fundamentally distinct 
account of mental content and his allegiance to the idea theory. It may, 
though, be instructive to consider teleological accounts of reasoning rather 
than of propositional content. Certain forms of reasoning are seen as good 
and others as bad and this distinction can be grounded in evolutionary terms. 
Good reasoning is that which has contributed to our biological fitness, the 
mechanisms for which thus selected for and inherited. Normativity, as it were, 
comes for free with a naturalistic, evolutionary account of the function of 
mental states.66 
Speculation concerning whether Hume would embrace such an account of 
how good reasoning (such as inductive inference) can be distinguished from bad 
(such as indoctrination) is not so stretched given such a distinction is right at the 
heart of the tension between Hume’s scepticism and naturalism. His sceptical 
arguments appear to undermine all forms of reasoning, yet, in the context of 
the discussion of miracles and elsewhere, inductive reasoning is recommended 
and taken to be ‘wise’.67 The coherence of his position is not obvious since his 
scepticism would appear to undermine the distinction between good and bad 
forms of reasoning (to which he does seem to be committed). However, here 
is one way to navigate this most central and contentious issue of Hume 
interpretation. Scepticism, for Hume, has an epistemic role. As Falkenstein 
puts it: ‘For Hume, an encounter with skeptical arguments diminishes the 
vivacity of all of our ideas, but certain beliefs (those originating from causes that 
we consider to be legitimate) are better able to recover from the blow.’68 As 
scepticism dims or extinguishes the products of the various mechanisms of 
belief acquisition – those involving, for example, indoctrination and faith – the 
force or vivacity derived from causal reasoning can shine through. Such 
reasoning applied to the beaks of finches, the fossil record and the genomes of 
populations of fruit flies inexorably leads to the belief in evolution by natural 
selection. Such belief can then be applied to what is today called the problem 
of normativity, and inductive reasoning can then be seen as justified since it is 
the product of natural selection. (Our fictional Hume, as head of his cognitive 
science programme, relieved that his youthful philosophical doubts are 
unfounded.) 
However, something here doesn’t sit well. First, we should remember the 
depth of Hume’s scepticism: it concerns the justifiedness of belief in the 
 
external world, one’s enduring personhood and the soundness of both inductive 
and deductive reasoning.69 Hume’s solution to scepticism, whatever that may 
be, must come before – must justify – belief in evolution, rather than the 
belief in evolution grounding his solution to scepticism. His account of 
normativity has to justify beliefs in the external world and inductive reasoning, 
whereas the justification of such beliefs and forms of reasoning is presupposed 
by science. Recall the earlier metaphor: scepticism dims the lights on poor forms 
of reasoning. Imagine them going down . . . not smoothly, as one might turn a 
dimmer switch, but patchily, as lights might go out in a theatre after a show, first 
the stalls, then the orchestra pit, then the gods. These areas of the theatre 
correspond to different forms of reasoning, with the individual seats in these 
areas corresponding to specific beliefs arrived at via these forms of reasoning: 
the stalls perhaps comprising beliefs that are the result of indoctrination, the 
gods, those arrived at by faith alone. When all the lights go out, though, it’s not 
completely dark . . . the red exit lights remain: causal reasoning the exit from 
scepticism. It is from this red light that good scientific reasoning develops, but 
the first flicker must itself be justified by something more fundamental, and 
not the blaze of scientific reasoning that will ultimately result. 
Evolutionary considerations have also been brought to bear on morality 
and moral theory. Joyce and Greene, for example, argue that moral thinking 
aids cooperation and therefore survival.70 This is, therefore, the function of 
morality – this is what it is for. Again, in one sense it’s plausible that our 
fictional Hume would agree that the psychological mechanisms involved in 
moral thinking are the product of natural selection.71 However, for Hume, the 
normativity constitutive of morality is grounded in feelings of approval felt 
from the com- mon point of view, those we appreciate via sympathy.72 That 
we have such sympathetic mechanisms is the key thing, whether or not such 
mechanisms are the result of evolution. The normative element is supplied by 
the point of view afforded by the mechanism of sympathy, not by the origin 
of this mechanism. The practice of morality may help explain our survival, but 
we suspect that Hume would baulk at the suggestion that this is what 
morality is for. Such     a way of putting it smacks too much of the kinds of 
teleological thinking at which his science of man is aimed. 
In this chapter, we have examined the notion of teleology in relation to Hume. 
After distinguishing certain metaphysical, Christian and political senses of tele- 
ology, we turned to Hume’s empirical science of man and clarified how it is 
opposed to teleological explanations of the workings of human nature. Not- 
withstanding Hume’s rejection of teleology, we have argued that he upholds  
a form of human flourishing which is in line with his empirical approach. We 
concluded by considering whether Hume would embrace contemporary 
teleological accounts of cognition and morality. We expect Hume would have 
probably been sympathetic towards Darwinism, but that he would have rejected 
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